Introduction
This is the first paper in what the authors hope will be a series on the role of the artillery at the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse, near the present-day Borough of Freehold, NJ. One of the most notable facets of this engagement is the usage of artillery -the Battle of Monmouth is known for having the largest field artillery duel of the American Revolution. Despite this, little has been written to date about the artillery at the Battle. In fact, most of the histories and research on the Battle of Monmouth have concentrated on the movements of generals and the infantry, the footunits of the army.
The impetus for this series came about from one specific visitor inquiry at Monmouth Battlefield State Park. A common enough question was asked of Park staff-members: "I think one of my ancestors was here at the battle…can you give me any information…?" This is a fairly typical question, except when it came to this particular ancestor, who was a Continental artillerist.
What initially started as a relatively simple research task has led to an intensive reevaluation of the entire battle from a distinct perspective.
To best carry out this reevaluation of the Monmouth campaign's usage of artillery, the series will divide the battle into different phases and topics in order to follow and identify as many of the artillery units as possible. This research will attempt to answer a number of questions and clear up some confusion from earlier accounts of the battle. This first paper will concentrate on the morning phase of the Battle of Monmouth, with the objective of identifying each of the artillery companies present in the initial attack of Major General Charles Lee and his advance corps on the rearguard of the British forces on that hot and humid day of June 28, 1778.
The morning phase of the Battle of Monmouth contains a significant amount of what is known about the Continental artillery during the campaign. It also presents one of the more confusing elements pertaining to the artillery -how many artillery pieces were actually present with General Lee's advance corps in the fighting of the morning? Various sources disagree; some state that there were ten guns with this advance force, some claim that there were twelve, while others play it safe by not making a firm determination, giving a range of "ten to twelve." This uncertainty has led to continued confusion as scholars, interpreters, and the public delve into the history of the battle. It is this key dilemma that this paper aims to resolve. Based on re-analysis of primary sources, and by taking a critical lens to secondary sources, this paper surmises that there were in fact five separate artillery companies, with two guns each, attached with Lee's advance corps, with a total number of armament fixed at ten guns.
The best way to reevaluate this issue is to start by doing an in-depth historiography of sources, looking at the history of how the Battle of Monmouth's artillery has been described and depicted over time. After this review, it is important to understand the structure of the Continental artillery as it was incorporated into Washington's army. With the insights gained from these studies, the final step is to reconcile these two sets of data to resolve the question at hand.
Historiography
One of the earliest sources describing the make-up of the Continental advance corps' artillery is a memorandum penned by Brigadier Generals Anthony Wayne and Charles Scott to George Washington on June 30, 1778, a mere two days after the fighting at Monmouth Courthouse.
To provide some context to this piece, both Wayne and Scott commanded separate infantry detachments of brigade strength in the morning portion of the Battle. This document was most likely sent to the Commander-in-Chief as a precautionary measure by the brigadiers. Both subordinate commanders anticipated that their immediate superior during the morning fight, Major General Charles Lee, was likely to face an inquiry in the near future. This memorandum amounted to an early deflection of blame on their part, a fact that would set the stage for the trial to come.
The document begins by stating the composition of forces in Lee's advance corps, and, most importantly, the number of guns with that force: "We received orders to march with the…detachments…with ten pieces of artillery properly distributed among the whole." 1 This is the earliest primary source detailing an exact number of guns, clearly stating that count being set at ten.
Less than a week later, on July 4 th in New Brunswick, NJ, the court-martial of Charles Lee began. The series of testimonies that came out of those proceedings are still considered to this day to be among the earliest and, in many cases, the most thorough primary source evidence for the morning and mid-day segments of the Battle of Monmouth. no definite number of guns, whether for the overall artillery of Lee's advance corps or for the artillery units assigned directly to his detachment.
3
In addition to these new entries by Wayne and Scott, the "Court-Martial" also introduces the narrative of events from the point of view of the senior artillerist in General Lee's forward element, Lieutenant Colonel Eleazer Oswald. His testimony gives the over-all number of the artillery in the morning to ten guns. Oswald goes on to state that at one point in the fighting of the morning he formed a "grand battery" of the artillery companies of the advance corps, detaching these units from their assigned infantry brigades to form one single body of massed artillery. 4 Oswald, in his testimony, clearly defined the different units with which he built up his "grand battery." For most of the morning, he had personally supervised the two-gun company of Captain Thomas Wells [assigned to Colonel Grayson's Detachment (Scott's Brigade)]. As Lee's forces pulled away from the vicinity of the town, Oswald gathered the two-gun company assigned to General Varnum's Brigade and a two-gun company assigned to General Wayne's Detachment.
Later during the retreat, Oswald also obtained the two-gun company attached to General Scott's Detachment and the two-gun company attached to General Maxwell's New Jersey Brigade. The units gathered throughout the course of the morning, beginning with the initial skirmish of the day through the retreat, brought the total number of guns in Oswald's battery to ten.
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The above two references from the "Court-Martial," the ten guns of Oswald's account and the twelve of Wayne's testimony, along with the Wayne-Scott "Memorandum," affected secondary sources writing on the Battle of Monmouth for generations. One example of this influence was seen in the oration given by Henry Armitt Brown at the centennial anniversary of 3 " [27] [28] [29] Ibid., 133. 5 Ibid., [133] [134] [135] the battle in 1878. In his re-telling of the morning events of the battle, Brown states that General Lee had twelve pieces of artillery distributed throughout the forces under his command. 6 Brown's 1878 commemorative "Battle of Monmouth Oration" was published years later, in 1913, and is a classic example of Victorian portrayals of history, a style which used elements from primary sources, in this case, the Lee "Court-Martial," along with local traditions (often hearsay) in its retelling of history. Additionally, the 1913 appearance of Brown's oration in a published format, a volume in the "Classics in the Grades Series," is an example of works known as "school histories," meant to educate school children of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These school histories, endeavoring to teach varied subjects related to world and American history, used orations on these topics to help sharpen the oratorical skills of these students. Brown's oration and similar legend-histories were common sources which made up many of the various school histories of the day. However, in both the 1876 original and the 1974 combined volume reprint, a misstated direct quote from the "Court-Martial" contributes further to the ongoing confusion over the total number of guns in the morning's advance corps. In quoting Wayne's description of the makeup of these units, Carrington lists the units correctly but misquotes the number of artillery pieces that were assigned to Scott's Detachment. As was previously noted, this number was stated as being four guns, however, Carrington's quote of the trial lists this number as two guns. 7 In researching this issue, all known published versions (1778, 1823, 1864, and 1873) of the "Court-Martial" were verified as stating these guns were set at four, a simple error on Carrington's or his publisher's account which added to the confusion of this issue. Stryker gave full editorial rights to Myers, who prepared Stryker's work for publication through Princeton University Press. The one caveat that Stryker's widow placed on this transfer was in ensuring that Myers gave full credit to Stryker's "extensive research and painstaking work" in preparing the piece. 10 Regarding his editorial influence on Stryker's work, Myers mentions in his "Introductory Note" that:
Other conditions of publication have made necessary the partial abridgement of the narrative and also the omission of some hundreds of pages of documents…I have made the endeavor to include everything of especial value and also, in making minor corrections, to preserve the original form and style of presentation as far as possible.
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An extensive effort to locate these omitted documents at various repositories has been unsuccessful. Despite Myers' heavy editorial work on the piece, Stryker's The Battle of Monmouth is still considered to be one of the single most influential and most complete secondary sources Col. Grayson did not get under way from Englishtown until about six A.M. Included in his detachment were four pieces of artillery, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Eleazer Oswald of the 2 nd Artillery regiment…Maj. Gen. Lee's main force broke camp and started about seven A.M.,…The order of march was: Brig. Gen. Wayne's and Brig. Gen. Scott's detachments under the command of Maj. Gen. la Fayette, followed by Brig. Gen. Maxwell's brigade. Col. Jackson's small detachment formed the rear. There were eight pieces of artillery with Lee's main force, two assigned to Wayne, four to Scott and two to Maxwell.
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Smith's above listing of the line of march, including the distribution of the artillery, is not the clearest presentation of this information, and may in fact contribute to the confusion. This same information is more concisely presented later in his work in chart form. 17 More importantly for the purposes of this current discussion, in both places Smith identifies the total number of artillery pieces as twelve.
Smith's lack of clarity did indeed affect the next set of historians who discussed the hand. Brown's 1878 "Battle of Monmouth Oration" exemplifies the popular Victorian method of portraying history in which elements of primary sources were used in conjunction with, and given equal historical weight as, local oral traditions and legend-histories. The primary purpose of these histories was to keep the memory of the events alive and pertinent to that generation. The emphasis of these works was not on the details but rather on the end results. The number of artillery pieces present in the morning in Brown's oration is therefore not given to present strict historical fact but is rather incidental to his re-telling of the events of the battle.
Carrington's and Stryker's work on the battle, however, illustrate a departure from this earlier model, exemplified by Brown's "Oration," in that both authors sought to implement a scientific approach in relating the information and chronology of the battle. Using the primary sources available to them, they sifted through the oral traditions, keeping what they deemed sound while casting out other elements that did not conform to eye-witness accounts. Exact numbers of artillery pieces are presented, based on various primary sources, and are pertinent to their discussion. Due to the methodology and the engaging writing style, these works quickly eclipsed the earlier style of facts-and-legends histories on the battle. For Carrington and Stryker, the details became just as important as the overall portrayal of the battle.
Ironically, the works of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries on the battle have tended, in some cases, to move away from the solely scientific approach advocated by Carrington and
Stryker. Many authors of this period have reincorporated some of the local traditional histories and thus have relied more on previous secondary sources than on the original documents. Regarding the Continental artillery, rather than looking at the primary sources afresh, the writers of this period depended heavily on the secondary source authors. In doing so, usage of inconsistent terminologies (i.e., detachments/brigades) and interpretation errors have resulted, in many cases, in each new iteration of the history departing ever more so from the facts of the primary sources. This is the crux of the matter: over-reliance of the most recent secondary sources, without a re-examination of the primary sources, has allowed these gun totals to be reported and re-reported for decades without any new and in-depth analysis of the issue. This lack of clarity, confusion, and the reign of error leaves the matter in a stagnant quagmire. It is the role of historians in every generation to reevaluate all forms of prior interpretation, not to simply disregard nor to take at face value what has come before, but to attempt to obtain the definitive truth.
Ten or Twelve?
In order to obtain this fresh perspective and better determine the true number of guns in the for it, the senior artillerist could assume command of the artillery companies assigned to the various brigades of the force and unite them as needed into larger groupings, including into one cohesive unit known as a "grand battery." These formations were used in combat when mass fire was needed as conditions demanded; the senior artillerist could dismiss individual companies back to their assigned brigades once they were no longer required. 32 It is important to note that these senior artillerists did not command artillery companies of their own; rather, they were field officers (colonels, lieutenant colonels, or majors) from one of the four regiments of artillery. with the guns assigned to Scott's Detachment, which Colonel Willet noted, very clearly and concisely, as having "charge of two field-pieces."
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The last and perhaps best evidence comes from Lieutenant Colonel Oswald himself. In his testimony during the "Lee Court-Martial," Oswald denotes only ten guns in service with Lee's advance corps. Oswald states:
I brought out my two pieces into the plain…I ordered Captain Wells to limber up the pieces…I then formed the pieces that were with General Varnum's Brigade, the two pieces that I brought over, and the two pieces under Captain Seward in an orchard, and began to cannonade a column of the enemy that was advancing on our right…I discovered on my left General Maxwell's brigade and General Scott's detachment coming out of the wood upon this eminence I had formed for action, and had taken two pieces from General Scott's detachment and two from General Maxwell's brigade, making in all ten.
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This statement was further questioned by General Lee, asking:
Are you certain that it was General Scott's detachment and General Maxwell's brigade that you saw come out of the wood, or their artillery only? A[nswer]. I am not certain that it was General Scott's detachment, but I got their artillery, and there was a body of men with the two pieces; but I am certain it was General Maxwell's brigade.
[authors' emphasis]
General Scott's own testimony in the "Court-Martial" corroborates both Oswald's and Willett's statements:
I thought proper to repass a morass and take place in a wood with a morass in my front. About this time I sent my artillery immediately back the road I came, into the field, finding it impossible for them to act on the ground I had taken, or even to get to it. Having established the ten-gun solution to the initial inquiry, a final question remains:
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Identifying the Companies
which artillery companies were they? The best way to determine this is to go back to the primary sources.
Preliminary Artillery Assignments, with Citations
As was previously mentioned, Lieutenant Colonel Oswald observed the majority of the initial phases of the morning battle with Captain Thomas Wells' Artillery Company. Oswald indicates in his testimony in the "Lee Court-Martial" that Wells' Company was assigned to Scott's Brigade. Some historians have referred to this brigade as "Grayson's Detachment," a reference to the unit's commander during the Monmouth campaign, Colonel William Grayson. This has been done in an effort to distinguish Scott's Brigade, commanded by Grayson, from Scott's Detachment, which was commanded by Brigadier General Charles Scott.
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The "Lee Court-Martial" also offers the infantry brigade assignments for two more artillery companies present with the advance corps. The fifth and final artillery company of the Continental advance corps is unknown. What is known is that this two-gun company would have been the artillery assigned to General Scott's Detachment of "picked men." Leaving this fifth company unknown is counter to the original purpose of this paper, which is to determine not only the number of guns in the morning but also to identify those field pieces. It is appropriate, therefore, to take a general survey of all the remaining artillery companies within the Continental Army to rule out the clear majority of them and to present several possible contenders.
The Fifth Company?
In examining the company muster rolls of the artillery regiments in the Continental Army during this period, certain determinations can be made. Each artillery company's monthly muster roll was signed by the commanding officer of the brigade to which they were assigned. Based on these findings, in addition to other circumstantial evidence found in primary sources, further 
Conclusion
In conclusion, confused secondary sources on the subject have muddied the matter of "tenor-twelve guns" in the morning at Monmouth by repeatedly using one divergent primary reference, a situation that has perpetuated to the present day. Historians over the years have concentrated their primary source research solely on a single document. the evidence as presented in the testimony found in the "Lee Court-Martial," often to the exclusion of other primary documents. The analysis presented in this paper, however, strives to incorporate all of the primary sources within the discussion of the morning artillery and its number of guns.
In going back and reanalyzing the primary sources, several competent documents stand out, including the "Memorandum" by Generals Scott and Wayne, indicating that there were ten pieces of artillery with Lee's advance corps. Lieutenant Colonel Oswald, the morning's senior artillery advisor, indicates in his testimony in the "Lee Court-Martial" that as the situation deteriorated during the retreat he began picking up artillery companies from the brigades to form a "grand battery" to delay the pursuing British and buy time for Continental forces to fall back towards Washington's lines. Oswald states that he collected ten guns, a figure which represents the total number present with the advance corps and which perfectly corresponds to the "one infantry brigade, one two-gun artillery company" system utilized by General Knox during this period.
Included in the ten guns Oswald collected was the two-gun artillery company from Scott's Detachment, not four guns (two companies) as is often described in most secondary sources.
Colonel Willett, whose memoirs are a seldom-used primary source in the historiography, clearly and firmly states two guns as being with Scott's Detachment. Period muster rolls and other interpreted evidence suggest Captain Andrew Porter's Artillery Company as the candidate for this unit's identity. The remainder of Oswald's testimony and other strong primary sources are clear as to the remaining four artillery companies, their number of guns, and their parent brigades.
Final Artillery Assignments
In the end, the evidence presented clearly indicates that there were ten pieces of artillery 
